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DUAL DISTRIBUTION AND THE HORIZONTAL-
VERTICAL DICHOTOMY OF NONPRICE
RESTRICTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
A crucial phase of any industry's manufacturing program is to
place its goods on the consuming market. In this regard, the manufac-
turer may either distribute the goods to dealers itself or engage a net-
work of independent distributors to do so. Commonly, however, a dual
distribution arrangement is employed whereby independent distribu-
tors are used in conjunction with direct distribution by the manufac-
turer. In both situations, the manufacturer will often impose certain
nonprice restrictions upon its distributors to reduce competition among
them.1 In turn, this promotes interbrand competition by enabling the
manufacturer to attract highly aggressive distributors and retailers, to
induce its distributors to engage in and contribute to promotional activ-
ities, and to exercise control over the service and safety of its products
in order to attract and keep its customers. 2
1. To reduce intrabrand competition, i.e., competition among different distributors of the
same product brand, the manufacturer will often impose nonprice restrictions on the area in which
its independent distributors may market the product. These territorial restrictions take the form of
exclusive and non-exclusive "areas of primary responsibility" whereby the distributor agrees to
concentrate his best efforts on marketing the product in that area. An area of primary responsibil-
ity clause does not prevent the distributor from making sales in other territories. If, however, he
fails to concentrate his best efforts in his assigned area, the distributorship is subject to termina-
tion. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION
3 n.6 (Monograph No. 2 1977). A territorial sales restriction clause, however, restricts the distribu-
tor from making sales outside of a specified territory. Id at 4.
Similarly, a manufacturer may impose customer restrictions on its distributors. These pre-
vent the distributor from making sales to specified customers or classes of customers regardless of
the customers' locations. Id at 4 n.9.
Similar restrictions may be imposed upon distributors by the manufacturer in a dual distribu-
tion arrangement. Customer restrictions may be more important here because the manufacturer
will want to reserve so-called national accounts, government contracts and foreign accounts to
itself. These accounts are more profitable to the manufacturer who is more experienced in negoti-
ating bulk orders. Additionally, area of primary responsibility clauses permit the manufacturer to
make sales within a distributor's area without violating the terms of the distributorship.
2. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 54-55 & n.23 (1977); ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION, VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION 5 (Mono-
graph No. 2 1977).
In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), the Court suggested that vertical
distribution restrictions may protect against aggressive competition and be a means by which a
small company may break into a market or remain in business. Id at 263. Impliedly, the Court
was recognizing that the overall effect of limitations on intrabrand competition may have the more
1
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An issue which has not been firmly and specifically decided is
whether such nonprice restrictions imposed upon distributors in a dual
distribution system are violative of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.3 The courts have developed two modes of analysis with which to
evaluate the legality of various business arrangements.4 Furthermore,
the decisions have come full circle in recent years regarding which
mode will determine the legality of such restrictions and the procedures
employed to enforce them. This Comment will examine the two modes
of analysis established by the courts for evaluating nonprice restrictions
employed in distribution systems. Specifically, the application of these
modes to a dual distribution system will be discussed in light of the
leading United States Supreme Court decisions.
II. NARROWiNG THE ISSUE
A. General Considerations
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very contract, com-
bination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal."' Such a broad proscription provides little gui-
dance to the business community or the courts for determining whether
a particular business arrangement is in compliance. On its face, the
language seems clear; any act or agreement which results in a restraint
upon trade is illegal. However, as Justice Brandeis noted, such a "test"
is too simplistic to be functional since "[elvery agreement concerning
trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of
their very essence."6 Such an observation is particularly true of non-
price vertical restrictions placed on distributors by manufacturers.
Such restrictions are designed to restrain the distributor from market-
ing the product outside of a particular geographic territory and/or limit
desirable effect of increasing or maintaining interbrand competition. Cf. Comanor, Vertical Terri-
torialand Customer Restrictions: White Motor and ItsAftermath, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1422-27
(1968) (vertical restrictions have the undesirable effects of eliminating intrabrand competition and
increasing market power and restricting price competition through product differentiation in inter-
brand competition). '
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section I provides that "[elvery contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal"
4. These modes of analysis are examined in notes 9-15 infra and accompanying text.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
6. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
1981]
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those customers to whom sales may be made. Therefore, under a plain
meaning interpretation of the Sherman Act, such restrictions are illegal.
The Supreme Court has not adopted this literal interpretation but
instead has developed two modes of analysis with which to evaluate
such restrictions, the per se rule and the rule of reason.7 As a result,
though the issue is whether a certain act, or agreement, or restriction is
illegal, the threshold question becomes which mode of analysis is to be
used. Although the ultimate decision on this issue necessarily decides
the legality of the restriction, the Court's analysis has typically focused
upon whether the restrictions are horizontal or vertical.
B. The Horizontal- Vertical Dichotomy
The relationship of the manufacturer to its distributors in a dual
distribution system is a factor which has troubled the courts. The man-
ner in which a court characterizes this relationship determines how a
restriction is analyzed. The current approach is to determine the func-
tional market level upon which each party operates. This, in turn, de-
termines the test to be applied by the court. Accordingly, restrictions or
agreements among persons at different levels of the market structure
are deemed vertical while those among persons at the same level are
termed horizontal.8
In a dual distribution system, the manufacturer, as a supplier, is
operating at a different market level than its distributors. However,
through its grant of areas of primary responsibility and its reservation
of certain national accounts to whom it makes direct sales, it is also
operating on the same level as its distributors. This raises the issue of
whether such an arrangement is vertical or horizontal and which mode
of analysis is to be applied to the restrictions the manufacturer places
upon its distributors.
7. See notes 9-15 infra and accompanying text.
8. Whether an agreement or arrangement is horizontal or vertical is determined by the func-
tional market level at which each party in the distribution chain operates. Accordingly, restric-
tions or agreements between persons at different levels of the market, e.g., manufacturer and
distributor, are deemed vertical. Those among competitors are termed horizontal. Horizontal
restrictions have been held to be per se illegal while the rule of reason has traditionally applied to
vertical restrictions. Cf. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), licensees of Scaly mat-
tresses were also stockholders and members of the executive committee of the board of directors.
Sealy allegedly conspired with its manufacturer-licensees to fix minimum resale prices and to
allocate mutually exclusive territories. The Supreme Court concluded that "[i]f we look at sub-
stance rather than form, there is little room for debate. These must be classified as horizontal
restraints." Id at 352. Consequently, the Court rejected the claim that the territorial restrictions
were vertical because "the stockholders and directors wore a 'Scaly hat' when they were acting on
behalf of Scaly." Id at 353.
[Vol. 17:306
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C. Modes of Analysis
Subsequent to the enactment of the Sherman Act, two extreme
views developed as to the proper application of section 1. At one end, a
literal reading of section 1 lead to the conclusion that Congress in-
tended a broad application which proscribed "[e]very contract, combi-
nation ... , or conspiracy in restraint of trade." 9  This early
formulation of the per se rule made no distinction between reasonable
and unreasonable restraints upon trade.10 Subsequent decisions re-
treated from this harsh view and distinguished between those restric-
tions which only indirectly restrained trade and those which restrained
trade directly." These early per se decisions were harmonized in
United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. 12 Since these decisions dealt
with price-fixing arrangements, the Socony-Vacuum Court held that
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (emphasis added). The classic statement of this line of analysis is:
inhere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreason-
able and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle ofperse unreasonableness not
only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain
to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly
cornplicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a partic-
ular restraint has been unreasonable--an inquiry so often fruitless when undertaken.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (holding that a tying-in arrangement
which compelled the grantee or lessee of certain lands to ship over the railroad/grantor's lines was
per se illegal). Cf note 13 infra (under the rule of reason analysis, this per se approach, as it
applies to certain conduct, is not disputed).
10. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
11. United States v. Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). Both Joint Traffic and Trans-Missouri
involved railroad cartels formed for the purpose of eliminating rate competition among members.
In Trans-Missouri, the Court held the cartel agreement illegal per se, 166 U.S. at 341. Retreating
from this position, the Joint Tra2ic Court held that section 1 of the Sherman Act
applies only to those contracts whose direct and immediate effect is a restraint upon
interstate commerce, and that to treat the act as condemning all agreements under which,
as a result, the cost of conducting an interstate commercial business may be increased,
would enlarge the application of the act far beyond the fair meaning of the language
used. The effect upon interstate commerce must not be indirect or incidental only. An
agreement entered into for the purpose of promoting the legitimate business of an indi-
vIdual or corporation, with no purpose to thereby affect or restrain interstate commerce,
and which does not directly restrain such commerce, is not, as we think, covered by the
act, although the agreement may indirectly and remotely affect that commerce.
171 U.S. at 568.
This approach was expanded so that in addition to summarily invalidating arrangements
which had actual, direct effects on competition, the Court would also invalidate those combina-
tions or agreements which resulted in an aggregate of market power capable of producing such
effects. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); United States v. Trenton Pot-
teries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
12. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The Court characterized as price fixing a concerted arrangement by
the major oil companies to purchase "distressed" gas on the spot market in order to control sharp
fluctuations in prices during periods when the oil industry was depressed.
4
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"[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and
with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the
price of a commodity in interstate commerce is illegalper se."1 3
The other view is that certain agreements or restrictions are not
illegal if the effect on competition is reasonable in light of all the at-
tending circumstances. 4 Though the rule of reason initially clashed
13. Id at 223. The Court relied upon the statement in Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. at 399-400,
that
[t]he aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one
form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, in-
volves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The
reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business changes become the
unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once established, it may be 
maintained unchanged
because of the absence of competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable
when fixed. Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in
themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry
whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on
the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to
day whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic condi-
tions. Moreover, in the absence of express legislation requiring it, we should hesitate to
adopt a construction making the difference between legal and illegal conduct in the field
of business relations depend upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are reasonable-a
determination which can be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of our eco-
nomic organization and a choice between rival philosophies.
310 U.S. at 213-14. See also United States v. Scaly, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436,
458 (1940) (citing United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927), for the proposition that
agreements which create potential power for price maintenance in a market are also per se illegal);
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). Accord, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 260 (1965)
("In any price-fixing case restrictive practices ancillary to the price-fixing scheme are also quite
properly restrained.").
Relying on the decision in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, see note 9 supra, courts have
extended this analysis to horizontal market division and group boycotts. See Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), and Fashion Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)
(group boycotts); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271 (1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899) (horizontal market division).
On February 8, 1982, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Coin-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp.,
1982-1 Trade Cas. 64,504 (6th Cir. 1982), held as a per se illegal group boycott, restrictions
imposed at the insistence of one distributor through its manufacturer on its co-distributors. The
court stated that "although the coercive pressure in this situation was applied vertically, we con-
clude that the stifling of competition ... was predominately horizontal, warranting application of
the per se rule of illegality as a group boycott." Id. at 72,783.
14. 166 U.S. at 354 (White, J., dissenting). "It is... not to be doubted that the interpreta-
tion of the words 'every contract in restraint of trade,' so as to embrace within its purview every
contract, however reasonable, would certainly work an enormous injustice and operate to the
undue restraint of the liberties of the citizen." Id
Justice Whites initial approach, which rejected any form of per se analysis, was that the
Sherman Act could not have been intended to proscribe every contract which had some re-
straining effect on competition:
To define. . . the words "in restraint of trade" as embracing every contract which, in
any degree produced that effect would be violative of reason, because it would include
all those contracts which are the very essence of trade, and would be equivalent of saying
that there should be no trade, and therefore nothing to restrain.
5
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with the per se approach, it was later modified so that both approaches
now coexist. 15 These approaches provide the extremes; however, a
common thread runs through both. Competition remains the standard
for any analysis of alleged antitrust conduct. The prevailing contro-
versy is whether non-price restrictions imposed by a dual distributor
are illegal per se as horizontal restrictions or whether they should be
classified as vertical restraints and analyzed under the rule of reason.
III. THE FORMATIVE DECISIONS
The Supreme Court has, through a trilogy of decisions, 16 at-
tempted to resolve this issue. Curiously, in no case has the Court prop-
erly recognized the problem as one involving a dual distribution
d at 351.
From this premise, Justice )White proposed a two-step analysis, whereby courts were to draw
a distinction between those arrangements which directly restrain trade or competition and those
which indirectly or partially had such an effect. If the restraint was indirect or partial, the courts
should determine whether the arrangement was proscribed by using reason after an examination
of all attending circumstances. Id at 351.
15. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), Chief Justice white employed
the rule of reason analysis which he had previously advocated in dissent. See note 14 supra.
However, he retreated from his initial position by recognizing the viability of a per se approach.
Under this reformulated rule of reason analysis, competition remained the fulcrum but the crucial
inquiry became whether the particular act or arrangement resulted in an undue restraint on trade.
Interpreting section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Chief Justice stated that
[t]he statute... evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce con-
tracts, whether resulting from combination or otherwise, which did not unduly restrain
interstate or foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from being restrained by
methods, whether old or new, which would constitute an interference that is an undue
restraint.
221 U.S. at 60.
Reason, in light of all the attending circumstances, remained the standard which guided the
court's judgment. Id Therefore, if the arrangement or restriction hadthe effect of suppressing or
eliminating competition, reason dictated that such a restraint was undue and illegal. In contradis-
tinction, a due or reasonable restraint on trade *,ould Be that which merely regulated competition.
This line of reasoning was picked up in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918), where Justice Brandeis stated:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to re-
strain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition.
Id at 238. In making this inquiry, courts should
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the restraint and its effect, ac-
tual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts.
id
16. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
6
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arrangement. 17 With the latest decision in the area of nonprice restric-
tions,18 the Court has come full circle so far as the applicable mode of
analysis. The split among the circuit courts on this issue,19 however,
indicates that this decision is not the last word.
In White Motor Co. v. United States,20 the Court was faced with its
first opportunity to deal with nonprice restrictions imposed upon dis-
tributors and dealers by a dual distributor. White Motor manufactured
trucks and sold them to distributors for resale to dealers and users, di-
rectly to dealers, and to certain large users. As part of its distribution
system, White Motor reserved several large accounts to itself and im-
posed territorial restrictions on its distributors and dealers.21 These
customer and territorial restrictions were alleged to be per se violations
of the Sherman Act.'
Without discussing the proper method of classifying such restric-
17. In White Motor, the manufacturer sold trucks and parts to distributors, retailers and large
users. 372 U.S. at 255. Similarly, Schwinn marketed its bicycles by selling to distributors, for
ultimate resale to franchised dealers, and by making direct sales to retailers. 388 U.S. at 370. In
neither case did the Supreme Court discuss the agreements as involving dual distribution.
18. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
19. These decisions are discussed at notes 67-81 infra and accompanying text.
20. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
21. Id at 255-56.
22. In addition to the territorial and customer restrictions, White Motor was charged with
price fixing. White Motor argued that the agreements fixing prices were "only an adjunct to the
customer restriction clauses and amounted merely to an agreement to give [those] classes of cus-
tomers [which White Motor reserved to itself through its customer restrictions and which included
so-called 'national accounts'] their proper discounts." Id at 257. Price fixing is per se illegal,
whether horizontal or vertical. See generally United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960), and Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (vertical price
fixing agreements); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951),
and United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (horizontal price-fixing agree-
ments). Any restrictive practices which are ancillary to a price fixing scheme are also illegal.
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944). White Motor did not challenge
the finding of price fixing and the Supreme Court held that Bausch & Lomb did not apply since
there had been no finding that the price fixing agreements were an 'integral part" of the customer
restrictions. 372 U.S. at 260.
White Motor claimed that the territorial restrictions were not illegal since they promoted
interbrand competition. Id at 256. Furthermore, it could have fully integrated its distribution
system which would have totally eliminated the need for a separate distributorship and dealership
program. This, however, was not economically feasible. Therefore, any reasonable restraint on
intrabrand competition should not be illegal since the effect was to enhance interbrand competi-
tion. Id Moreover, arguing that the customer restrictions were not illegal, White Motor asserted
that
one of [its] purposes was to assure [itself] 'that "national accounts," "fleet accounts" and
Federal and State governments and departments and political subdivisions thereof,
which are classes of customers with respect to which [it) is in especially severe competi-
tion with the manufacturers of other makes of trucks and which are likely to have a
continuing volume of orders to place, shall not be deprived of their appropriate dis-
counts on their purchases of repair parts and accessories from any distributor or dealer,
with the result of becoming discontented with The White Motor Company and the treat-
7
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tions when employed in a dual distribution arrangement, the Court de-
clared the restrictions to be vertical.' However, it declined to decide
whether the rule of reason or per se rule was to be applied. Noting that
"[h]orizontal territorial limitations . . .are naked restraints of trade
with no purpose except stifling of competition," 4 it was unclear that
vertical territorial restrictions have a similar effect. Since the rule of
reason "normally requires an ascertainment of the facts peculiar to the
particular business,"2 the Court was unwilling to reach a conclusion
on the merits since appeal had been taken from the district court's
grant of summary judgment. 26
Two important points may be drawn from the White Motor deci-
sion. Initially, though the Court did not expressly acknowledge that
White Motor was a dual distributor, it implied as much in its descrip-
tion of the distribution arrangement.27 Nevertheless, the Court un-
ment they receive with reference to the prices of repair parts and accessories for White
trucks.'
Id at 257.
23. 372 U.S. at 261.
24. Id at 263. The Court analogized horizontal territorial restrictions to group boycotts and
refusals to trade which had been held to be per se illegal in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). 372 U.S. at 263.
25. 372 U.S. at 261.
26. Id at 263. See United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
The Court acknowledged that, due to the lack of a trial on the merits, it did not
know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements
emerge to be certain. They may be too dangerous to sanction or they may be allowable
protections against aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small com-
pany has for breaking into or staying in business and within the "rule of reason."
372 U.S. at 263.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan noted that the territorial restrictions provided a
novel question and that "[t]o gauge the appropriateness of aper se test [in this situation] we must
determine whether experience warrants, at this stage, a conclusion that inquiry into the effect upon
competition and economic justification would be ... irrelevant." Id at 265-66. Regarding the
customer restrictions, Justice Brenhan suggested that they
would seem inherently the more dangerous of the two, for they serve to suppress all
competition between manufacturer and distributors for the custom of the most desirable
accounts. At the same time they seem to lack any of the countervailing tendencies to
foster competition between brands which may accompany the territorial limita-
tions. ...
The crucial question to me is whether, in any meaningful sense, the distributors
could, but for the restrictions, compete with the manufacturer for the reserved outlets. If
they could, but are prevented from doing so only by the restrictions, then in the absence
of some justification neither presented nor suggested by this record, their invalidity
would seem to be apparent.
Id at 272-73.
27. There are two points in the opinion where it was implicitly noted that White Motor was a
dual distributor. In the statement of the facts, the Court stated that "White Motor manufacturers
trucks and sells them (and parts) to distributors, to dealers, and to various large users." Id at 255.
Secondly, in arguing that the customer restrictions were permissible, White Motor stated that
there was no reason why a distributor should not be limited to selling to one class of customers
8
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hesitatingly declared the territorial restrictions to be vertical. 28  In
doing so, the Court focused upon the source of the restrictions for the
purpose of distinguishing vertical and horizontal restrictions rather
than the type of distribution arrangement employed by White Motor.2 9
Secondly, the Court indicated three possible conclusions on the legality
of nonprice territorial and customer restrictions. Depending upon the
evidence presented at trial, such restrictions may be per se illegal or
may be protected under the rule of reason as "allowable protections
against aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small
company has for breaking into or staying in business."30 The Court
returned to these issues in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 31
Again, however, the Court failed to properly characterize the type of
distribution involved.
Schwinn, a family owned business engaged in the manufacture
and sale of bicycles, sold its products primarily through wholesale dis-
tributors with sales to the public through retailers. It marketed its
products through three principal methods: 1) sales to bicycle distribu-
tors for resale to distributors; 2) sales to retailers by consignment or
through an agency arrangement with distributors; and 3) sales to retail-
ers under the so-called Schwinn Plan whereby bicycles were shipped
directly to the retailer by Schwinn with a commission being paid to the
distributor taking the order.3 2
Under Schwinn's marketing arrangement, specific geographical,
"exclusive" territories were assigned to its distributors with instructions
to sell only to franchised Schwinn dealers and only within their respec-
tive territories. 3 As for its franchised retailers, Schwinn's franchise
"and the manufacturer reserve the right to sell to another class of customers." Id at 258. In light
of the facts and White Motor's claims, the point was made clear that it was engaged in dual
distribution at the time the restrictions were challenged.
28. Id at 261.
29. This is, however, tenuous ground upon which to base this decision. In a dual distribution
arrangement, the manufacturer also operates at the same level as its distributors. To simply look
to the source of the restrictions raises the question of whether the restrictions were promulgated by
the manufacturer in its manufacturing capacity or in its distributor capacity. This approach lacks
support in light of United States v. Scaly, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). There, the Court held that
market divisions imposed by a licensor upon licensees were horizontal market divisions and not
vertical since the licensees owned all of the stock of the licensor. In response to the argument that
"stockholders and directors wore a 'Scaly hat' when they were acting on behalf of Scaly," the
Court stated that in determining whether such agreements were vertical or horizontal, the empha-
sis was upon "the identity of the persons who act, rather than the label of their hats." 1d at 353.
30. 372 U.S. at 263.
31. 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. IMI. 1965), rev'd and remanded, 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
32. 388 U.S. at 370.
33. Id at 371.
[Vol. 17/:306
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agreement limited the number of retailers in any given area and limited
the franchise to a specified location. Further, each franchised dealer
was to purchase Schwinn bicycles only from or through the authorized
distributor in that area and could sell only to consumers.34 It was these
restrictions which were challenged by the government in addition to
the allegation that Schwinn had been "firm and resolute" in its enforce-
ment of these restrictions.35
The Supreme Court characterized Schwinn's distribution system
as "a truly vertical arrangement, raising the fundamental question of
the degree to which a manufacturer may not only select the customers
to whom he will sell, but also allocate territories for resale and confine
access to his product, to selected, or franchised, retailers." 36 Referring
to the suggestion in White Motor that vertical territorial restrictions
may be governed by the rule of reason,37 the Court distinguished the
practices of Schwinn. It noted that Schwinn was the largest manufac-
turer of bicycles, "not a newcomer, seeking to break into or stay in the
bicycle business. 3 8 Nor was the Court persuaded by Schwinn's argu-
ment that its distribution program was not illegal since it enabled
Schwinn and its distributors "to compete more effectively in the
34. Id at 370-71.
35. id at 372. The district court found that the government had failed to prove its price-
fixing allegations. 237 F. Supp. at 329. This issue was not appealed. 388 U.S. at 368. Addition-
ally, the government abandoned its position that Schwinn's distribution restrictions were per se
illegal and urged that a standard of "presumptive illegality" be employed to invalidate such re-
strictions. 388 U.S. at 374 n.5. It is not clear whether the government was attempting to establish
a new test or whether this "presumption" was to be the new standard for analysis under the rule of
reason. See id at 368 ('[W]e are asked to consider these limitations in light of the 'rule of reason,'
and ... to conclude ... that they constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade.").
Under the suggested theory, once it has been shown that there is a vertical restraint, the
practice is to be presumed illegal unless the defendant can show that the restraint is reasonable.
The Schwinn Court rejected this approach, holding that "[the burden of proof in antitrust cases
remains with the plaintiff.. .. " Id at 374 n.5. Cf. In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978),
and In re Pepsico., Inc., 91 F.T.C. 680 (1978) (proof of a vertical restraint establishes a prima facie
case of illegality which shifts the burden of proof to defendant).
36. 388 U.S. at 378. As noted by the Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433
U.S. 36 (1977), however, the Schwinn Court did not follow its announced purpose:
The Court acknowledged the Government's abandonment of itsper se theories and
stated that the resolution of the case would require an examination of "the specifics of
the challenged practices and their impact upon the marketplace in order to make ajudg-
ment as to whether the restraint is or is not 'reasonable' in the special sense in which § 1
of the Sherman Act must be read for purposes of this type of inquhy." Despite this
description of its task, the Court proceeded to articulate the. . . "bright line"perse rule
of illegality for vertical restrictions ....
433 U.S. at 44 (citations omitted).
37. 372 U.S. at 263. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
38. 388 U.S. at 374.
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marketplace. 39
Noting that under its marketing system Schwinn sold its bicycles
to distributors for ultimate resale to retailers, the Court held that
[o]nce the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has
parted with dominion over the product, and his effort thereaf-
ter to restrict territory or persons to whom the product may be
transferred-whether by explicit agreement or by silent com-
bination or understanding with his vender-is a per se viola-
tion of § 1 of the Sherman Act.4"
Presumably, the Court chose the first alternative suggested by White
Motor as a proper result for nonprice vertical restrictions. 1
The per se rule announced in Schwinn has been criticized as "the
most egregious error in all of antitrust. 42 It also prompted judicial
attempts to minimize or distinguish it "in ways that are a tribute to
judicial ingenuity. ' 43 At its best, the language in Schwinn created
many openings through which subsequent decisions have avoided its
harsh per se approach.
39. Id at 374-75. The Court stated:
Schwinn sought a better way of distributing its product: a method which would promote
sales, increase stability of its distributor and dealer outlets, and augment profits. But this
argument, appealing as it is, is not enough to avoid the Sherman Act proscription; be-
cause, in a sense, every restrictive practice is designed to augment the profit and competi-
tive position of its participants. Price fixing does so, for example, and so may a well-
calculated division of territories. The antitrust outcome does not turn merely on the
presence of sound business reason or motive. Here, for example, if the test of reasona-
bleness were merely whether Schwinn's restrictive distribution program and practices
were adopted "for good business reasons" and not merely to injure competitors, or if the
answer turned upon whether it was indeed "good business practice," we should not quar-
rel with Schwinn's eloguent submission or the finding of the trial court. But our inquiry
cannot stop at that point. Our inquiry is whether, assuming nonpredatory motives and
business purposes and the incentive of profit and volume considerations, the effect upon
competition in the marketplace is substantially adverse.
Id at 375 (citation omitted).
40. 388 U.S. at 382. The Court's failure to apply the rule of reason prompted criticism. See
notes 35-36 supra.
41. In White Motor, the Court suggested that vertical territorial restrictions may or may not
have the same effect as horizontal division of markets. 372 U.S. at 263. However, the Court did
suggest that such restrictions "may be too dangerous to sanction." Id The Schwinn Court ap-
pears to have relied upon this guidance:
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to
restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manu-
facturer has parted with dominion over it. Such restraints are so obviously destructive of
competition that their mere existence is enough.
388 U.S. at 379 (citations omitted).
42. Handier, Twent-Five Years of Antitrust, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 415, 458 (1973). Professor
Handler noted that, in Schwinn, Justice Fortas based his decision on the assumption that vertical
territorial restrictions violated "the ancient rule against restraints on alienation." 388 U.S. at 380.
To Professor Handler, this clearly ignored history and the common law which had applied the
rule of reason to vertical restriction. 73 COLUM. L. Rv. at 458.
43. Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 243, 272 (1975).
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Essentially, two major criticisms of Schwinn, aside from its result,
formed the bases for subsequent decisions. Regarding which rule ap-
plies to post-sale restrictions on distributors, the Court held that
"[u]nder the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manu-
facturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an
article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion
over it." 4 In Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp. , the circuit court held that the
language in Schwinn was limited to its facts and, in the present case,
there was more than merely post-sale territory and customer restric-
tion.4 Therefore, the restraint was to be examined under the rule of
reason.47
Second, in Schwinn the Supreme Court noted the district court's
finding that Schwinn had been "firm and resolute"'48 in its enforcement
of its territory and customer restrictions.49 Subsequent decisions have
distinguished Schwinn, holding that territorial and customer restric-
tions are not per se illegal unless they have been enforced by the manu-
facturer in a "firm and resolute" manner.50  These problems led to the
Court's reconsideration of Schwinn.
IV. CURRENT TREATMENT OF NONPRICE VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS
A. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.
The most recent Supreme Court decision brings the applicable
44. 388 U.S. at 379 (citations omitted).
45. 286 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aft'd, 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1970).
46. 425 F.2d 936. In Trooli, the manufacturer of beauty and barber supplies restricted sales
by distributors to professional consumers due to the potential dangerous nature of the products if
applied by nonprofessionals. This restriction was held not to be a per se violation of the Sherman
Act:
Here there is more, and the restraints are of a different order. Tripoli does not charge
that it or any other Wella distributor is confined, in reselling, to a specific territory. Nor
does Tripoli charge that it or any other Wella distributor is confined to reselling to
"franchised" beauty or barber shops. The restraint is on a wholesale distributor's resel-
ling products intended for professional application to non-professional retail end users.
Id Accord, Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 375 F. Supp. 1, 63 n.87 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (secret
agreement between patentee and manufacturer restricting legal actions for patent infringement
was not an unreasonable restraint on trade); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374,
1380 (Ct. CL 1971) (patent licensee agreement requiring patent licensee to resell patented drug
product only in combination with other drugs was not violative of antitrust laws).
47. 425 F.2d at 936.
48. 237 F. Supp. 323, 342 (N.D. IlL 1965).
49. 388 U.S. at 372.
50. See Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1346, 1367-68 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aft'din
part andrev'dinpart, 548 F.2d 795, 806 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Colorado
Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637,639 (10th Cir. 1973); Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin
Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406 (2d Cir. 1968).
1981]
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mode of analysis for nonprice vertical restrictions full circle. In Con-
nental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,51 a franchised retailer chal-
lenged a restriction imposed by the manufacturer on the location from
which the products could be sold. The Court viewed this case as an
opportunity to re-examine its decision in Schwinn.
Sylvania, a television manufacturer, attempted to boost its market
share of national television sales by phasing out its wholesale distribu-
tors and making direct sales to a small, select group of franchised re-
tailers. One goal of this new system was to reduce intrabrand
competition which, in turn, would encourage more aggressive retailers
to become franchised. To further promote this goal, Sylvania limited
the number of franchises in any given area and required each to make
sales only from the location or locations at which it was franchised.
These areas were nonexclusive territories and Sylvania reserved the
right to add retailers in any area in which the existing retailer had
failed to develop a market."
Continental T.V. was a franchised retailer of Sylvania televisions
in the San Francisco area. As a result of its dissatisfaction with sales in
that area, and over Continental's protests, Sylvania franchised an addi-
tional retailer at a location in close proximity to that of Continental.53
Continental requested, but was denied, permission to open a store in
Sacramento. Subsequently, however, Continental transferred Sylvania
merchandise to a new store in that area. Shortly thereafter, Sylvania's
credit department reduced Continental's credit substantially, where-
upon Continental withheld payment to Sylvania's finance company.
Sylvania then terminated Continental's franchise.5 4
51. 433 U.S. 36 (1977), a~fg 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976).
52. 433 U.S. at 38.
53. In retaliation, Continental cancelled a large Sylvania order and placed a large order with
a competing brand manufacturer. Id at 39.
54. Id at 39.40. The circuit court found that, unlike the territorial restrictions in Schwlnn,
Sylvania had imposed location restrictions on its dealers. These were restrictions on vendors,
while the territorial restrictions in Schwinn applied to vendees. 537 F.2d at 990. Furthermore,
Schwinn was distinguished on the effect of its restrictions.
[T]here are very clear and substantial differences between the effect of the restrictions in
Schwin and the effect of those of Sylvania. In Schwinn a wholesale distributor was
foreclosed from selling Schwinn products to any purchaser located outside his exclusive
territory; thus, intrabrand competition (i.e., competition between sellers of the same
brand) was wholly destroyed. A potential purchaser of Schwinn products at the whole-
sale level could look to only one source of the product--the authorized dealer for his
territory. No other wholesaler could compete by offering a lower price or better service
to the same purchaser. In marked contrast, Sylvania franchised at least two dealers in
the major markets and each Sylvania dealer wasfree to sell to any buyer he chose-
preserving intrabrand competition and allowing to every potential purchaser of Sylvania
products a reasonable choice between several competing dealers.
[Vol. 17:306
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As in Schwinn," the Sylvania Court characterized the restrictions
as vertical.16 Further, the Court was unable to distinguish the facts in
Sylvania from the situation in Schwinn,57 even though Sylvania did not
involve restrictions imposed by a dual distributor. However, acting
upon Sylvania's suggestion that Schwinn should be reconsidered, the
Court acknowledged that there was a need for clarification of the law
and that this justified reconsideration of the per se principle announced
in Schwinn.5 8
It was noted that, in Schwinn, "[t]he pivotal factor was the passage
of title: All restrictions were held to beper se illegal where title had
passed, and all were evaluated and sustained under the rule of reason
where it had not."5 9 Breaking from this reasoning, the Sylvania Court
stated that there was no basis for the Schwinn distinction between sale
and nonsale transactions.60 As a result, it concluded that this distinc-
tion did not justify application of a per se rule in one and a rule of
reason in the other.6' Consequently, the rule of reason was reinstated
as the proper mode of analysis for vertical restrictions62 and the per se
rule stated in Schwinn was overruled.63
Id (emphasis in original). Based on these essential distinctions, the court held that Schwinn was
not controlling and the location restrictions were to be analyzed under the rule of reason. Id at
1001.
55. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
56. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
57. Id at 45. "Thus, the Schwinnper se rule applies unless Sylvania's restriction on location
falls outside Schwinn's prohibition against a manufacturer's attempting to restrict a 'retailer's free-
dom as to where and to whom it will resell the products." Id at 45-46 (citations omitted).
58. Id at 47.
59. Id at 52.
60. As for Schwinn's emphasis upon the passage of title to the goods, the Sylvania Court held:
It appears that this distinction between sale and nonsale transactions resulted from
the Court's effort to accommodate the perceived intrabrand harm and interbrand benefit
of vertical restrictions. Theperse rule for sale transactions reflected the view that verti-
cal restrictions are "so obviously destructive" of intrabrand competition that their use
would "open the door to exclusivity of outlets and limitation of territory further than
prudence permits." Conversely, the continued adherence to the traditional rule of rea-
son for nonsale transactions reflected the view that the restrictions have too great a po-
tential for the promotion of interbrand competition to justify complete prohibition. The
Court's opinion provides no analytical support for these contrasting positions. Nor is
there even an assertion in the opinion that the competitive impact of vertical restrictions
is significantly affected by the form of the transaction. Nonsale transactions appear to be
excluded from theper se rule, not because of a greater danger of intrabrand harm or a
greater promise of interbrand benefit, but rather because of the Court's unexplained be-
lief that a completeper se prohibition would be too "inflexibl[e]."
Id at 52-54.
61. Id at 57.
62. Id at 59.
63. Id at 58. However, the Court cautioned that it did not "foreclose the possibility that
particular applications of vertical restrictions might justifyper se prohibition under Northern Pa.
cfc Ry. Co. But we do make clear that departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based
14
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B. Aftermath of Sylvania
As in White Motor and Schwinn, the decision in Sylvania has led
to divergent results in the lower courts, especially regarding nonprice
territorial and customer restrictions imposed upon distributors and
dealers by a dual distributor. The question the Supreme Court has
failed to address is whether nonprice restrictions imposed by a dual
distributor are vertical, hence subject to a rule of reason analysis, or
whether they are horizontal and per se illegal.' 4 Restated, in light of
Sylvania, the issue becomes whether that decision applies only to
purely vertical restrictions or whether it is equally applicable to restric-
tions imposed by a dual distributor.65
Nonprice restrictions imposed by a dual distributor have both hor-
izontal and vertical characteristics. Since the manufacturer is also act-
ing as a distributor, imposition of territorial and customer restrictions
resemble proscribed horizontal division of markets. At the same time,
the restrictions are imposed upon distributors by the dual distributor
which is operating in its manufacturing capacity. Thus, the restrictions
assume the characteristic of vertical restrictions. In either case, the re-
sulting effect upon interbrand-intrabrand competition is the same.
Currently, there is a split between the lower courts as to the proper
test which should be applied in a dual distribution arrangement. Those
courts which have applied the per se rule tend to emphasize the hori-
zontal characteristics of the restrictions.66 In support of this position,
an analogy is made to United States v. McKesson & Robbins,67 where
the Court held that fair trade agreements68 between a manufacturer-
upon demonstrable economic effect rather than--as in Schwinn-upon formalistic line drawing."
Id at 58-59.
64. Sylvania did not alter the long-standing rule that horizontal nonprice restrictions are per
se illegal. 433 U.S. at 50 & n.16, 57 & n.27. Seealso United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S.
596 (1972); United States v. Scaly, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
65. This question necessarily arises from the fact that both White Motor and Schwinn in-
volved a dual distribution arrangement. See note 17 supra.
66. See American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975); Pitch-
ford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1975); Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471
F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1973); Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), aJ'dper
curiam, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co., 579 F.2d 954 (5th
Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 591 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1979).
67. 351 U.S. 305 (1956). McKesson & Robbins, a wholesale distributor which also manufac-
tured its own brand of drugs, refused to sell its drugs to independent wholesalers who had not
entered into fair trade agreements with it. Many of its wholesalers in direct competition with
McKesson & Robbins' own wholesale division signed these agreements whereby they agreed to
resell the products at the wholesale price fixed by the manufacturer.
68. Fair trade agreements are similar to resale price maintenance in that they establish the
minimum or maximum price at which the manufacturer's products will be sold. Vertical agree-
[Vol. 17:306
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wholesaler and its independent wholesalers amounted to price-fixing
agreements between competitors. The Court emphasized that the trade
agreements involved were between parties competing at the same func-
tional market level.69
Those courts which applied the per se rule to nonprice restrictions
imposed by a dual distributor have, impliedly, extended the decision in
McKesson & Robbins. Typical of these decisions is Hobart Bros. Co. v.
Malcolm T Gilliland, Inc. 70 in which the court held that the effect of
any agreement to impose territorial restrictions by a dual distributor is
"to eliminate competition" between the manufacturer and its distribu-
tors on the distribution level.71 Therefore, though these agreements ap-
peared to impose vertical restrictions, they were held to be horizontal.
The court concluded that "[s]uch an arrangement must be treated as it
operated in practice rather than 'as arranged by skillful drafting."' 72
Sylvania is distinguishable from these cases on the ground that in Syl-
vania, the Court was dealing with vertical restrictions only and not re-
strictions imposed by a dual distributor.73
At the same time, some courts have chosen to emphasize the verti-
cal aspects of such restrictions, resulting in the application of the rule of
reason.74 Each court approached the characterization problem differ-
ently yet each reached the conclusion that the restrictions were vertical.
The court's treatment of the restrictions inAbadir & Co. v. First Missis-
sipi Corp. 75 represents a unique approach to the characterization
ments of this sort may be established either consensually or by the manufacturer's refusal to deal
with those distributors who refuse to abide by the prices. See ANTrrRusT ADVISOR § 2.25 (2d ed.
C. Hills 1971).
69. 351 U.S. at 313.
70. 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1973).
71. Id at 899. Accord, Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd,
417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969).
72. 471 F.2d at 899.
73. See, ag., Pitchford Scientific v. PEPI, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 685, 688 (W.D. Pa. 1977), on
remandfrom 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1975). In Sylvania, the Court warned that "[t]here may be
occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from horizontal restrictions originating
in agreements among the retailers. There is no doubt that restrictions in the latter category would
be illegalper se ...." 433 U.S. at 58 n.28.
74. See Copy-Data Systems, Inc. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 1981-2 Trade Cas. 64,343 (2d
Cir. 1981); Abadir & Co. v. First Mississippi Corp., 651 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1981); Donald B. Rice
Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980), cft'd, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981);
Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1981); Cowley v.
Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1980); H & B Equipment Co., Inc. v. International
Harvester, 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 1979-2 Trade
Cas. 62,806 (C.D. Cal. 1979). See also First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d
1164 (9th Cir. 1980).
75. 651 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1981). First Mississippi, a producer of fertilizer and chemicals,
distributed its products through its own employees but used brokers to reach certain customers
1981]
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problem in a dual distribution situation. Stating that "[t]he rationale
for eachper se rule is an economic analysis of the agreement, ' 76 the
court enumerated the "potential economic advantages" to the supplier
who imposes restrictions upon distributors. 7 The "test" proposed for
determining whether a restriction is vertical or horizontal in a dual dis-
tribution arrangement was whether "the party imposing the agreement
has the potential economic advantages typically available to a supplier
in a vertical market-distributing agreement. If these potential eco-
nomic advantages are absent, then the agreement is horizontal. '78
Other decisions have focused upon the source of the restrictions so
that restrictions imposed by a manufacturer are vertical even though
the manufacturer may be a dual distributor.7 9 Still other courts have
and to develop new markets. First Mississippi agreed to sell urea, an inorganic chemical used for
fertilizer and industrial use, to Abadir, a broker, with the understanding that the urea would only
be resold for use in Asia. Upon discovering that Abadir had sold the urea without any limitation,
First Mississippi refused to deliver any of the compound. Id at 424.
76. Id at 426.
77. Id at 426-27. In this regard, the court pointed out that
[w]hile horizontal market distributing agreements have no significant potential advan-
tages to the participants other than a reduction in competition, vertical market-distribut-
ing agreements do have significant potential economic advantages which are legitimate.
The distributor or distributors on whom such agreements are imposed are only benefit-
ted by a reduction in competition. But the supplier imposing such agreements has sev-
eral potential economic advantages which are legitimate: attractrni competent and
aggressive retailers, inducing retailers to engage in promotional activities, market-distri-
bution efficiency, and maintaining control over the safety and quality of the product.
Furthermore, unless some legitimate advantage is truly necessary, a supplier will not
have any interest in imposing such an agreement on its distributors. A supplier will
normally prefer stiff compe ,tition among its distributors. This keeps the distributors' sell-
ing prices as low as possible, thereby maximizing the manufacturer's sales.
Id (citations and footnotes omitted). Accord, Copy-Data Systems, Inc. v. Toshiba America, Inc.,
198 1-2 Trade Cas. 164, 343 (2d Cir. 1981). See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433U.S. at 55.
78. 651 F.2d at 427. If horizontal, then the agreement is per se illegal even though the manu-
facturer/suppler is the soure f the restriction. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S.
596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).79. See Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750, 754 (D. Md.
1980). On appeal, however, the circuit court affirmed the lower court decision but rejected "any
iplication.., that a restraint may always be regarded as vertical if it is imposed by the manu-
facturer." Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15. 16 (4th Cir. 1981).
The district court rejected "a functional analysis directed at the impetus, purpose, and effect
of the restrictions." 483 F. Supp. at 74. It viewed any such analysis as a method of characterizing
restrictions as vertical or horizontal, as dupicativhe ofmt il of reason analysis for determining
the legality f the restraints. Consequently, it preferred to combine the horizontal/vertical inquiry
with the application of the rule of reason. Id In the circuit court's view, a distinction should be
drawn between
a conspiracy among dealers and their supplying manufacturer for the purpose of retail
price maintenance that would benefit the dealers and one involving the same parties but
redounding primarily to the benefit of the manufacturer as a result of increased in-
trabrand competition. A restraint imposed by the former conspiracy would be horizon-
17
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taken the position that the distributor is an "agent" of the manufacturer
and, therefore, not a competitor of the manufacturer even though the
latter is engaged in dual distribution. °
V. DISCUSSION
In a dual distribution marketing system, such as that in White Mo-
tor and Schwinn, the manufacturer not only operates at a different
market level than its distributors and retailers, but, by making direct
sales to retailers and large accounts, also operates at the same market
level as a distributor. Therefore, nonprice territorial and customer re-
strictions imposed upon distributors and retailers by a dual distributor
have both vertical and horizontal characteristics. In Sylvania, the
Court stated that it was dealing with vertical restrictions"1 and it could
find no basis upon which to distinguish that case from the situation
presented in Schwinn.82 This assertion illustrates the basic misconcep-
tion under which the Court has operated.
The White Motor and Schwinn Courts failed to recognize that the
manufacturers involved were dual distributors and proceeded to deal
with the restrictions as though they were imposed in a purely vertical
situation.8 3 Consequently, Sylvania, in overruling Schwinn's sale-non-
sale distinction and substituting the rule of reason for the per se rule in
a non-dual distribution situation, can logically apply only to nonprice
restrictions which are purely vertical. The remaining question then be-
comes whether Sylvania has any application to similar restrictions em-
ployed by a dual distributor.
If Sylvania is to apply to these types of restrictions, then two inter-
related problems must be resolved. Where the manufacturer does not
distribute its goods directly, the general approach is to characterize any
restrictions which it may impose upon its distributors as vertical merely
by identifying the manufacturer as the source of the restrictions. How-
ever, where the manufacturer is operating in a dual capacity through
tal in nature andper se illegal, while one imposed by the latter would be vertical and
analyzed under the rule of reason.
638 F.2d at 16.
80. Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1005 (5th Cir.
1981).
81. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
82. Id at 46.
83. This problem in White Motor is discussed at note 27 supra. In Schwinn, bicycles were
sold to distributors for resale to franchised retailers, but Schwinn also made direct sales to some
retailers. 388 U.S. at 370.
1981]
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direct distribution of its products and its network of independent dis-
tributors, the Sylvania approach to the characterization problem loses
its simplicity. If the restrictions are characterized as vertical, then the
horizontal aspects are ignored. Likewise, if the restrictions are charac-
terized as horizontal, then the fact that the manufacturer is the source
of the restrictions is diminished.
In resolving the issue, it appears that the "demonstrable economic
effect" standard of Sylvania84 can be applied to the threshold issue of
the proper characterization of the restrictions, much the same way that
the Sylvania Court applied it to discard Schwinn's "formalistic line
drawing" in determining the legality of vertical restrictions. Several
factors are relevant to this inquiry, which, though similar to those es-
poused in Abadir & Co. v. First Mississippi Corp. ,85 should take into
consideration the effects of such restrictions upon interbrand and in-
trabrand competition.
Since a manufacturer's motivation for imposing territorial and
customer restrictions vary, courts should attempt to isolate those that
are relevant to each particular case. Generally, a manufacturer will
impose such restrictions in order to obtain certain efficiencies in its dis-
tribution system with a view towards maintaining or improving its mar-
ket power relative to its competitors. InAbadir, the court labeled these
as "potential economic advantages"8 6 which included "attracting com-
petent and aggressive retailers," preventing free riders by "inducing re-
tailers to engage in promotional activities," and "maintaining control
over the safety and quality of the product."87 If the party employing
the restrictions in question obtains these economic advantages which a
manufacturer normally has, then the restrictions are vertical and sub-
ject to the rule of reason. If not, then they are horizontal and illegal per
se.
88
One advantage to this characterization approach is that it takes
into consideration the vertical and horizontal aspects of dual distribu-
tion restrictions. In addition, it encourages an analysis based upon eco-
nomic effect at each critical stage and not simply after a restriction is
characterized as vertical.
One objection to this method is that the analysis is duplicated in
84. 433 U.S. at 58-59.
85. 651 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1981). See also notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text.
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the rule of reason analysis to determine the legality of vertical restric-
tions.8 9 This should not be a serious objection,90 since the purpose
served by each step is different. Under this two step analysis, the court
must focus its attention upon two separate objectives. Initially, the
court's primary concern is whether the restrictions are vertical or hod-
zontal. If the court finds that the restrictions were not intended to pro-
vide the manufacturer with the benefits of legitimate marketing
efficiencies, then the logical conclusion is that they were intended to
have no effect except the restriction or elimination of competition.
These restrictions should be labeled horizontal and per se illegal.
However, if the court's analysis reveals that the restrictions were
intended to enhance the manufacturer's marketing system by promot-
ing legitimate market efficiencies, then these restrictions should be
deemed vertical. The logical economic effect of these restrictions is to
promote the manufacturer's interbrand competitive position by reduc-
ing competitive rivalry among its distributors.
Once the court determines that the restrictions are vertical, it
should then focus on whether the restraint on trade caused by the re-
striction is reasonable. Though this analysis under the rule of reason
may involve consideration of the same factors involved in the initial
characterization step, the court's emphasis is now on the legality of the
restrictions and not the motivation behind them. In this regard, addi-
tional factors should be considered which bear upon the economic ef-
fect of the restrictions. Included among these are whether the
restrictions have enabled a company to enter the market or remain in
business, whether the manufacturer is able to enter into a new market,
or whether the restrictions have served to protect a manufacturer from
aggressive competition. 91 If such benefits are realized, then the restric-
tions should be upheld as reasonable. However, if the economic bene-
fits do not result, then the court should conclude that the application of
the vertical restrictions justifies per se treatment as having a "perni-
cious effect on competition."92
This two-step economic analysis provides a court with a flexible
method of analyzing nonprice territorial and customer restrictions in a
89. Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750, 754 (D. Md. 1980),
aft'd, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981).
90. See Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15, 16 (4th Cir. 1981), a'g,
483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980).
91. 372 U.S. at 263.
92. 433 U.S. at 58.
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dual distribution system. Furthermore, it gives necessary consideration
to the dual aspect of such restrictions. It is in this sense that Sylvania
may be applied in those cases involving a dual distributor.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nonprice restrictions employed by a dual distributor should not be
held per se illegal simply due to their restraining effect upon intrabrand
competition. Nor should they be subject to a rule of reason analysis
simply because they are imposed upon the distributors by the dual dis-
tributor-manufacturer. Instead, future decisions should look to the effi-
ciencies which result from use of the restrictions and, accordingly,
whether this was the primary motive or intent of the dual distributor in
imposing the restrictions. Such an approach allows the courts to em-
ploy a per se rule when the effect of the restrictions on competition is so
pernicious that they lack any redeeming virtue. At the same time, how-
ever, it permits flexibility since application of the per se rule or the rule
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